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PHILOSOPHY AS VERSE-PERFORMANCE:  
FIVE POEMS AND A FORMALIST PROSPECTUS 
CHRISTOPHER NORRIS UNIVERSITY OF CARDIFF 
Introduction 
The following poems—or verse-essays—are part of an on-going project with two principal and 
closely related aims. One is revive the fortunes of the broadly philosophical verse-essay, a genre 
that has been largely neglected over the past two centuries and more since its highpoint in the 
long literary eighteenth century. The other is to show how this can best be achieved through a 
formalist poetics involving the deployment of regular rhyme-schemes and likewise regular metrical 
structures played off against the shifting patterns of speech rhythm. This all runs very much 
counter to currently approved practice, at least among prominent (mostly academic) arbiters of 
taste, so I had better explain some of the issues raised by conjoining these two distinctly un-modish 
attempts. 
The main thrust of avant-garde theory over the past few decades has been toward an idea of 
literary language that locates its resistance to passive or conformist habits of writing or reading 
primarily in ‘the text’. This latter is then conceived—in post-structuralist fashion—as a site of 
conflicting significations that are defined in terms applying with equal pertinence to poetry or 
prose (for a fairly representative sampling of work in this vein, see Norris and Machin 1987). That 
is, it tends to neglect matters of a formal (by which I mean chiefly metrical, rhythmic, prosodic, 
syntactic, or verse-structural) character so as to engage more intently with the textual and 
intertextual aspects of poetic discourse. These aspects are more amenable to treatment by those—
especially philosopher-critics or theorists bred up on a mixture of post-Kantian idealism with post-
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structuralist ideas about language—who see it as their main role to mediate the relationship 
between poetry and theory. Although these critics do on occasion take note of certain formal 
features it is usually by way of a brief detour from that other, to them more absorbing and 
philosophically as well as poetically important business. It strikes me—no doubt as an interested 
party—that much of the contemporary poetry approved, promoted, anthologised, or encouraged 
by such criticism can itself fairly be said to suffer from a kindred defect. It often goes beyond the 
modernist revolt against ‘traditional’ rhyme and meter—a revolt quite compatible (as in T.S. Eliot) 
with a high degree of formal inventiveness in both respects—to something more like a cultivated 
disregard for such elements.  
The result, in many cases, is a flattening-out of verse-rhythms through the lack of any metrical 
counterpoint. One feels that the poem might just as well have been written in prose since there is 
nothing—or nothing of a properly poetic, i.e., formally constrained but also formally inventive and 
liberating character—to warrant that generic description. This applies especially to the language 
poets (or L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets, as they like to be known) who emerged as a loosely associated 
movement in the 1970’s and occupied ground that, in principle at least, overlapped to a striking 
extent with the territory I have been trying to stake out here (see especially Andrews and Bernstein 
1984; also Bernstein 1992 and 1999; Hejinian 2000; McCaffery 1986 and 2001; Perelman 1996; 
Silliman 1987; Ward 1993). These poets, Charles Bernstein and Steve McCaffery among them, are 
highly self-conscious and theoretically aware about the kinds of effect they wish to achieve in 
creative practice and the kinds of relationship they seek to establish with various poetic and 
philosophical precursors. In brief: they reject (what they see as) the prevailing subjectivist or 
expressivist (i.e., neo-Romantic) ethos of much contemporary poetry; go in wholeheartedly for 
post-structuralist ideas of écriture, the ‘revolution of the word’, and the limitlessly plural or scriptible 
text; enthusiastically, and for just those reasons, endorse the Barthesian ‘death of the author’; 
likewise approve the post-structuralist idea of literature’s socio-political function as the undoing of 
bourgeois ideology by deconstructive, semioclastic, or other such textual means; and, again 
following Barthes, take the naturalisation of the signifier/signified dyad as the basic mechanism by 
which language colludes in our willing submission to the lures of ‘common-sense’ thinking. Along 
with these goes the further belief that the signifiers ‘poetry’ or ‘poem’ (not to mention ‘poet’) have 
for too long served to promote a notion of literary works as affording privileged access to realms 
of experience beyond reach of prosaic or rational grasp.  
The language-poets advance this case with a passion clearly born of 1960s political-cultural 
ferment and transposed, via post-structuralism, to the register of a dissident or radical poetics 
squarely at odds with the whole bad hegemony of received languages and verse-forms. They also—
as scarcely needs adding—have a deep (and in some ways healthy) suspicion of the first-person 
subject whose agonies and ecstasies, along with more humdrum emotions, are the fulcrum of 
most poetry in the mainstream lyric tradition. I won’t deny the appeal that such ideas have exerted, 
and continue to exert, on my own thinking about poetry and theory. Nobody who reads these 
pieces with an ear and eye to their formal (narrative as well as verse-poetic) aspects would be likely 
to take them as straightforwardly expressing my own beliefs or indeed the belief-set of any unified, 
autonomous, or integral first-person self. To that extent I am happy to acknowledge an affinity with 
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what the language-poets—or their most influential promoters (usually the same people)—place 
high on their creative-critical agenda. There is also a genealogical connection in respect of our 
shared sources in that line of jointly poetic-philosophical writing that goes back through Yale-
School deconstruction to the Jena Romantics. However, in the case of the language poets, there is 
something too easily or unresistingly achieved about that two-way reciprocal passage between 
poetry and theory, or the fluency with which these writers modulate from a (nominal) poetry 
overtly engaged with issues in criticism and theory to a theoretically-angled criticism with claims—
not always very strongly borne out—to constitute poetry in itself. The result is very often a hybrid 
discourse that fails to match either the creative flair of the best literary theory or the subtlety, range 
and conceptual resources of a poetry that makes best use of verse techniques for its own 
distinctive purposes.  
This can most plausibly be put down to a deficit of just those formal attributes, such as rhyme and 
meter, that the language poets frequently denounce as at best mere relics of an antiquated verse 
tradition and at worst a means of inducing compliance with the norms of bourgeois subjectivity. 
On the contrary, I’d say: it is just those formal attributes that best, most effectively and durably 
exemplify poetry’s power of resistance to ideological conditioning, whether by the sometimes 
restrictive effects of first-person (e.g., lyric) individualism or—more to the point here—by the 
subject’s proclaimed dissolution into a multitude of intertextual discourses, codes and 
conventions. Hence the feeling of linguistic inertness in so much language-poetry and the 
impression it gives of endlessly announcing but never remotely achieving that revolution of the 
bourgeois signifying order first envisaged a full half-century ago by the left wing of French 
structuralist poetics (see for instance Belsey 1980; Kristeva 1984; Young 1981). My verse-essay 
about Mallarmé is relevant here since it reflects on the various sources of a double and co-
implicated movement of thought, one that starts from Mallarmé’s diagnosis of a ‘crisis’ ([1986] 
(2010) afflicting the high culture of nineteenth-century French classicism and presages the 
increasing permeability of any generic boundary between poetry and theory, along with the 
erosion of those formal features that once underwrote (albeit in historically and culturally variable 
ways) that same distinction. Hence the current anti-formalist bias and, closely allied to that, the 
prejudice against any poetry that argues a case as distinct from deploying symbolist-approved 
modes of oblique, evocative, highly metaphoric, non-discursive, analogical, non-consecutive, 
spatially conceived, and hence maximally non-prosaic language.  
However what this attitude gives to poetry in terms of expanded creative-imaginative horizons it 
promptly takes away in terms of formal resources and capacity to earn its keep as a discourse of 
reasoned dialogical exchange. The precedents again go a long way back, to the English Romantics 
at least, although it wasn’t until recent times that the idea of radically re-jigging the poetry/prose 
dichotomy was translated from the realm of generalised precept to poetic practice. Thus 
Wordsworth ([1800]) 1991) said that the relevant distinction was that between poetry and science, 
not poetry and prose, while Shelley ([1821] 2001)—with larger territorial aims in view—said that all 
major thinkers, discoverers, reformers, scientists and other visionary types should properly be 
accorded the title of poet. Yet neither of them, even Wordsworth in the prosier parts of Lyrical 
Ballads, went so far as to draw the inverse corollary of this and remove even those vestiges of 
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rhyme and meter that remained of the old (now despised) eighteenth-century ‘poetic diction’. That 
was left to the avatars of twentieth-century modernism and its various, often to begin with 
academically sponsored but nowadays far more widespread and popular manifestations.  
Anti-formalism has had yet further harmful effects. One has been the regrettable division of labour 
between literary theorists working in self-conceived vanguard movements like post-structuralism 
or deconstruction and scholar-critics of a more traditional, often philological bent with a primary 
interest in prosody, metrics, stylistics, structuralist poetics, and genre-theory. (To be sure there are 
those, like Derek Attridge [1995; 2013], who refuse that division and pursue both projects with 
notable success.) Meanwhile a good deal of recent poetry—including, non-coincidentally, some of 
the work most favoured by university-based critics—continues to make a point, even a chief virtue, 
of its indifference to such presumptively obsolete concerns. Moreover one gets the impression 
that a main requirement for any poem appearing in some metropolitan literary journals is that it 
bear no formal marks of being a poem except those of having an unaligned right-hand margin and, 
very often, a looser grammatical (not to mention thematic and argumentative) structure than one 
expects of decent prose. It seems to me that this has often gone along with a sizeable and 
uncompensated loss of those manifold expressive, technical, and (not least) philosophical-
reflective resources that are there to be had from rhyme and meter. Anti-formalism and pan-
textualism can perhaps be seen as flipsides of the same post-Romantic coin, a coupling that I think 
has a lot to answer for in terms of current poetic and literary-critical practice. 
 
Mallarmé (‘A cast of dice . . . . ’‘) 
This is a poem about Mallarmé’s symbolist poetics with an eye both to its formal innovations in 
verse-technique—his response to the ‘crisis’ he perceived as afflicting the classical tradition of 
French poetry—and to the themes of chance and necessity evoked most suggestively in Un coup 
de dés. Seeing no future in anything like the traditional rhyme-schemes and metrical forms which 
had entered that presumptive state of crisis Mallarmé set out to create a poetry of visual, spatial, 
and (perhaps) ultimately mystic-numerical import that would break with all such precedent. This 
would bring about the conditions for an epochal advance in the currently stalled unfolding of 
poetry’s formal possibilities and expressive scope. Moreover it would  show by such means how 
certain kinds of highly disciplined poetic creation—or certain modes of highly wrought analogical 
thought—might demonstrate (as  promised in the poem’s opening line) that ‘a cast of dice will 
never abolish chance’.  
My verse-essay makes its point contre Mallarmé by sticking resolutely to iambic pentameter (the 
national-cultural equivalent of the French alexandrine so despaired of by Mallarmé) and adopting 
a rhyme-scheme about as tight, ‘classical’ and (seemingly) restrictive as could well be conceived. 
However this is just my point: that if we want a perfect analogy for the paradox that Mallarmé 
obliquely propounds, that is, the idea of chance (and hence, he implies, of freedom or creative 
choice) as somehow re-emerging on the far side of necessity then we could hardly do better than 
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invoke the instances of poetic rhyme and metre. It is just such formal exigencies that may prompt 
the poet, even (or especially) when hard pressed, to all sorts of otherwise improbable discovery or 
invention. In which case, ironically enough, Mallarmé’s theme in Un coup de dés might be said to 
find its most striking enactment or exemplification in just those features of the classical tradition 
whose obsolescence he so fervently proclaimed. At any rate such has been my experience during 
five years’ work in the interstices of poetry-writing and poetics: that it is chiefly through those 
distinctive verse-attributes—their capacity to dislodge or side-track thought from its habitual 
linguistic-conceptual grooves—that poetry differs from prose. Or rather, since sweeping claims in 
that regard are always open to objection by counter-example: it is one chief line of defence for 
verse-essays like mine that their various turns of argument are carried, invigorated, sharpened, 
and sometimes sprung upon the rhyme-questing mind by the pressures and challenges of formal 
constraint. 
   
  
My dear Degas, poems are not made out of ideas. They’re made out of words. 
 
The flesh is sorrowful, alas, and I have read all the books.  
 
The work of pure poetry implies the elocutionary disappearance of the poet, who 
yields the initiative to words. 
 
Everything in the world exists in order to end up as a book. 
 




It’s still a toss-up (or so Mallarmé 
    Would have us reckon) even though the dice, 
Once cast, must surely come to rest this way 
 
Or that and so relieve us in a trice 
    Of any thought that randomness might play 
Some role beyond that moment of precise 
 
And punctual outcome. Yet the coup de dés, 
    For him, entailed no such dehiscent slice 
Through time’s continuum since it jamais 
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N’abolira le hasard. If the price 
    Of this was constellating the array 
Of signifiers page-wide (a device 
 
That neutered rhyme and rhythm) then he’d pay 
    It happily since then we’d profit twice: 
By liberating hazard from the sway  
 
Of pitiless Ananke with her vice- 
    Like grip, and breaking free of that passé 
Verse-idiom whose methods to entice 
 
A better class of reader now betray 
    Their less than noble lineage. Suffice 
It here for old-guard classicists to say 
 
His revolution found no room for nice 
    Prosodic points (‘absente de tous bouquets’, 
These blooms) or fine-tuned strategies to splice 
 
The even measure of a well-made line 
    With such slight upsets to the steady beat 
As might allow the odd alexandrine 
 
To risk its dignity with some discreet 
    Yet innovative shift to reassign 
Stress-patterns over the adjacent feet 
 
And tease the ear. No wonder they decline, 
    Those prosodists, to contemplate retreat 
From principles that let them thus combine 
 
Verse-discipline with strategies that meet 
    The challenge of Ananke through a fine 
And subtly-judged refusal to deplete 
 
Too much of their good stock and so enshrine 
    Pound’s ‘make it new!’ as just the cry to greet 
Each succès de scandale. They intertwine, 
 
These issues, with his master-plan to cheat 
    Necessity as if on some cloud nine 
Where words no sooner land than, tout de suite, 
 
348 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 2 (2) (2017) 
 
They self-configure into sibylline 
    Star-patterns whose receding waves delete 
All signals save from those white dwarves that shine 
 
As witness to a universe whose heat- 
    Death’s imaged in their intricate design. 
By such means only might his words secrete 
 
The chemistry of that explosante-fixe, 
   That finite though unbounded cosmos traced 
By cancelling the metric troughs and peaks 
 
Of old-style scansion so that their displaced 
    Vocalic energies, through verse-techniques 
More exigent in kind, not go to waste 
 
But reconfigure in a form that seeks 
     An end to all mere poetising based 
On voix humaine. Here language never speaks 
 
In modulated tones and accents graced 
    By rhyme and metre, or more subtly sneaks 
Its entre-nous back in to meet the taste 
 
Of readers unimpressed by such critiques 
    Since refuge-seekers in that even-paced 
And sonorous verse-music that now reeks, 
 
To modernists, of all that once disgraced 
    The poetry of those—from ancient Greeks 
To Hugo and beyond—who interlaced 
 
Art-speech and common parlance.  By such tweaks 
    To that eurhythmic partnership they braced 
The vocal nerve to furbish up antiques 
 
Of prosody instead of such mad haste  
     To free the page of any sound that freaks 
The Mallarméans or offends the chaste  
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Since ear-decoupled gaze of those intent 
    On coupling eye and intellect. The main 
Idea behind this epochal event 
 
(For such he deemed it) in the verse-domain 
    Was to display how words might represent 
The throw of dice by which Ananke’s bane 
 
Might yet be lifted or perchance relent 
    So far that all the outcomes still remain 
In play as if time’s arrow underwent 
 
A freeze-frame on its flight to ascertain 
     Some further outcome, or as if the bent 
Of natural necessity might strain 
 
Against itself. Then think to what extent 
    Effects of rhyme or metre both constrain 
And liberate, or how they supplement 
 
The work of thought in ways we can’t explain 
     Except by retrodicting what we meant 
To say from what we said. Even so, this train 
 
Of reasoning’s sure to throw us off the scent 
    Since no sign-constellation can ordain 
It in the poet’s gift to circumvent 
 
The fact that their best efforts to sustain 
    That saving power might better yet be spent 
Musing how chance events in rhyme’s domain 
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Giverny 
 
You’ll understand, I’m sure, that I’m chasing the merest sliver of colour. It’s my own 
fault. I want to grasp the intangible. It’s terrible how the light runs out. Colour, any 








The critic Florent Fels encountered … a proud, small old man, who dodged the 
obstacles in his path uncertainly. Behind the thick lenses of his spectacles, his eyes 
appeared enormous, like those of an insect searching for the last light. 
Ross King, Mad Enchantment: Claude Monet  
and the Painting of the Water Lilies (2016) 
 
 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
   Years since I dreamed I’d get the colours right. 
No painted lily graces the mind’s eye. 
 
Nice of Cezanne to praise me up, but why 
   Make something wondrous of an old man’s plight? 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
 
Ten minutes - more or less - and I’d get by 
   On memory plus technique as best I might. 
No painted lily graces the mind’s eye. 
 
Photography is one new trick I try 
   To conjure up their hues again despite 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
 
Time was when those four minutes used to fly 
   Yet hues would iridesce throughout their flight. 
No painted lily graces the mind’s eye. 
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My dear friend Clemenceau says I’ll raise high 
   The nation’s cultural stock, but I take fright: 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
 
I’d rather he just spare a passing sigh 
   For all the hues now lost to vision’s blight. 
No painted lily graces the mind’s eye. 
 
Giverny’s my dream-world, yet a far cry 
   From what that vision once strove to requite: 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
 
The critics praise my lilies but apply 
   Mere words that spell them out in black and white. 
No painted lily graces the mind’s eye. 
 
The mind’s its own place and disclaims what I 
   Read in each change of hue, however slight: 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
 
Then there’s the pigments shifting as they dry 
   Through some strange interzone of day and night. 
No painted lily graces the mind’s eye. 
 
That eye of mine sees colours go awry 
   Through cataracts that further cloud my sight. 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
 
I scarcely know where water ends and sky 
   Begins, so it’s sheer chaos I invite: 
No painted lily graces the mind’s eye. 
 
How splendid our precursors who defy 
   The chaos by their colours clear and bright. 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
 
Some days there are when all that fake bonsai 
   And other Japanese stuff seems just trite. 
No painted lily graces the mind’s eye. 
 
Georges says he’ll fix it so the state will buy 
   And house my lilies if I just sit tight. 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die. 
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For what’s the point of some cut-price Versailles 
   If likeness isn’t your ambition’s height? 
No painted lily graces the mind’s eye. 
 
A torment to me, that I won’t deny, 
   Yet still I prize those flickerings of the light. 
Four minutes at the most, and then they die; 





The Reality of the Past: two views 
 
Realism about the past entails that there are numerous true propositions forever 
in principle unknowable. The effects of a past event may simply dissipate …. To the 
realist, this is just part of the human condition; the anti-realist feels unknowability 
in principle to be simply intolerable and prefers to view our evidence for and 
memory of the past as constitutive of it. 
 Michael Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (1991) 
 
 
Her only thought: ‘This ends it, leaves no shred 
   Of it behind, our life before 
His going. “Nothing’s changed by this”, he said, 
   “No part of it, of my and your 
Past lives, but think instead 
   There’s all the more, 
Even as we look ahead, 
   To look back on and so restore 
To life’s bright pattern the unbroken thread 
   Of how things were.” His letter tore 
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His only thought: ‘I hear it, hear the pain 
   And grief in those last words, though she 
Can’t cancel out the good things that remain 
   From back then, all the years that we, 
I know, can’t live again 
   Yet still must be 
Real-time since they contain 
   Shared reference-points that she’ll agree 
Stand firm. But suchlike memory-talk’s in vain: 
  “You’ve wiped all trace of you-and-me”,  
She says, “and left no good link in the chain”.’ 
 
Our only thought: how then to judge this pair 
   Of shell-shocked young survivors whose 
Time-warped perceptions of the past they share 
   Suggest the other they accuse 
Is not the one whom they’re 
   So loth to lose 
And who thus has to bear 
   Whatever sharp reproach they choose 
To level, but themselves for taking care 
   That time befriend them and refuse 
All quarter to their partner in despair. 
 
For it’s our case that’s dress-rehearsed when they 
   Pursue this vain attempt to show 
Either (for her) that nothing could defray 
   The cost in lives annulled since no 
Truth-reckoning lets us say 
   How much might go 
The evanescent way 
   Of all those years, or else (for so 
He thinks of it) that everything should stay 
   Just as it was in each tableau 
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And yet, you know, their differend doesn’t quite 
   Fit our case, us survivors less 
Concerned to get the time-conundrum right,  
   His way or hers, or second-guess 
How far that answer might 
   Ease her distress 
Since now there’d come to light 
   No further memories to oppress 
Her past-unburdened soul, or else invite 
   His glad assent since bound to bless 
Remembrance with a direct line of sight. 
 
Let’s say the issue’s not, for us, the sort 
   To stir such passions as appear 
In his attempt to hold the time-line taut 
   As truth requires and hers to shear 
A link that’s lately brought 
   No souvenir 
Unless to stir new thought 
   Of love as Plato’s sundered sphere 
With corresponding halves that truly ought 
   To mate yet never will. Though we’re 
Stray hemispheres the thing’s not quite so fraught. 
 
I mean, we’ve come out somewhere on the far 
   Side of those wandering orbits, yet 
Perhaps (please help me here) still are, 
   Years on, not quite prepared to let 
The question go or bar 
   All cause to fret  
When crossed ellipses jar 
   On us who thought we’d paid our debt 
To time and truth. Now perturbations mar 
   The steady state we hoped we’d get 
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Structuralism and Its Discontents 
The mind cannot remain at rest in a mere repertorization of its own recurrent 
aberrations; it is bound to systematize its own negative self-insight into categories 
that have at least the appearance of passion, novelty, and difference.  
Paul de Man, ‘Roland Barthes and the Limits of Structuralism’ (1990) 
 
 
Neat theory, but I doubt it fits our case. 
Granted, all signifiers slip and slide, 
Yet bygone signifieds still leave their trace. 
 
The gap between might be just empty space 
With nothing meant since meaning’s open wide. 
Neat theory, but I doubt it fits our case. 
 
If breaking up seems easier to face 
When past intent affords no future guide, 
Those bygone signifieds still leave their trace. 
 
Splendid idea for structuralists to base 
Their doctrine on, though here it’s misapplied: 
Neat theory, but I doubt it fits our case. 
 
Too much gets lost in synchrony’s embrace 
As it canutes all thought of time and tide 
While bygone signifieds still leave their trace. 
 
‘If signs make sense,’ they say, ‘then it’s by grace 
Of signifiers, not things signified.’ 
Neat theory, but I doubt it fits our case. 
 
And if they say such doubts are out of place 
Since theorists have the whole thing cut-and-dried, 
Then bygone signifieds still leave their trace. 
 
Behold those structures crumbling apace. 
Time-lapse affirms what synchrony denied. 
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Lacanians think the signifier-chase 
Goes on and on, but that idea’s belied 
When bygone signifieds still leave their trace. 
 
For we’re the sorts who need to interlace 
Times past and present lest they subdivide 
And that neat theory retrofits our case 




Doors and Pictures: Wittgenstein 
This poem about the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein has its generative source, as regards both 
topic and rhyme-scheme, in the two words ‘say’ and ‘show’. Wittgenstein’s early philosophy—as 
likewise, in a different way, his later thought—turned crucially on that contrast whether pushed in 
a linguistic, metaphysical, ethical, or quasi-mystical direction. My poem reflects on the multiple 
ironies of his life and work, among them the fact that, so far from ‘giving philosophy peace’ by 
getting philosophers to drop all those futile since merely abstract disputes, his writings managed 
to spawn an academic cult and a full-scale industry of Wittgenstein scholarship and exegesis. It is 
constructed around that resonant pair of rhyme-sounds (say/show), which of course runs the risk 
of becoming a protracted and rather tedious technical tour de force. However the poem is 
redeemed, I hope, by conveying a sense of how Wittgenstein deployed his own intellectual and 
temperamental traits—austere, rigorous, obsessive-compulsive, self-disciplined to the point of 
self-torment—in some highly creative and idiosyncratic (if philosophically bewilderment-inducing) 
ways. 
It is, I should say, a very far from reverential piece which aims to puncture a few of the pomposities 
that currently surround his work and have allowed some very dodgy or questionable arguments 
to gain widespread currency. On the other hand it does try to honour what is impressive—even in 
an odd way exemplary—about Wittgenstein’s facing up to his private demons and managing to 
keep them from doing more in the way of harm to others. Still one can’t help wishing that he’d 
given them a bit less grief and that the Wittgenstein commentariat hadn’t so often emulated the 
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A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language 
and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.  
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
 
A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that’s unlocked and opens inwards; 
as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push it. 
 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 
 
I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really 
to be written only as a poetic composition.   
Culture and Value 
 
 
He had this thing about what you could say 
    And what you couldn’t say but only show. 
To make that point, he thought, the only way 
    Was to push ‘say’ as far as it would go. 
With that in mind he’d put up an array 
    Of reasonings more geometrico, 
Along with a meticulous display 
    Of numbered parts that made it seem as though 
The thing was too well-built to go astray. 
    This would ensure that those chaps in the know, 
Bertie and his lot, had their role to play 
    As dupes in Ludwig’s stratagem to blow 
A T-shaped hole in everything that they, 
    Like his Tractarian double, took as so 
Self-evident as strictly to convey 
    No more than syllogistic might bestow 
By way of sense or content. Yet dismay 
    Set in when those same chaps proved far too slow 
To take his point, or eager to essay 
    Some risk-containment exercise that no 
Depth-rumblings might disturb. This helped allay 
    Their nagging sense that he’d contrived to stow 
Something in his oblique communiqué 
    That threatened to upset the status quo 
Of language, truth, and logic. Anyway 
    They picked it up, the cryptic undertow 
In this strange work of Russell’s protégé, 
     But made sure it was kept so far below 
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Deck in the first translation as to stay  
     Disarmed of any spanners it might throw 
Into the works. For there they’d ricochet 
    And cause no end of philosophic woe 
To Russell and those heralds of the day 
    When mystics would repay the debt they owe 
To logic. Then they’d see fit to obey 
    Such rational demands as bid them toe 
No line where superstition’s apt to prey 
    On trust or faith says reason should forego 
Its privilege. Keep saintliness at bay, 
    His colleagues thought, lest worldly wit lie low 
In deference to it and extend the sway 
    Over weak minds of any holy joe 
With some new crack-brained gospel to purvey, 
    Or any US-style politico 
With God on board. That stuff was now passé, 
    So Russell thought, that Sunday-School tableau 
Got up with all the faux-naiveté 
    By which the firm of Jesus Christ & Co 
Had managed so adroitly to portray 
    Their potentate as power’s most powerful foe. 
 Yet this ignored Saint Ludwig’s dieu caché, 
    His hidden god (think Pascal, think Godot), 
Whose failure to arrive as promised may, 
    To souls elect, reveal the vapid flow 
Of saying’s intellectual cabaret 
    Struck dumb. Thus having nothing à propos 
To say—and falling silent—might defray 
    The cost of all those endless to-and-fro 
Discussions spawned, he thought, by the decay 
     Of what once found expression (think Rousseau) 
In sentiments that showing might relay 
    Once all the saying’s done. On this plateau 
The tribe of bons sauvages join Mallarmé 
    In savouring only fragances that blow 
From flowers that have their place in no bouquet, 
    Or hues that vanish in the gaslight glow 
Of rainbows shadowed by the grey-on-grey 
    That passes muster in the Savile Row 
Of logic-suited thought. The first rule: pay 
    No heed to anything we cannot sew, 
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Us stitchers-up, to standards checked OK 
    For sticking to the proper ratio 
Of words to thoughts and things lest words outweigh 
    Truth’s currency and thinking undergo 
Such figural bewitchments as betray 
    Its old malaise. His message: we should grow 
Alert when language ‘went on holiday’ 
     Since here it often held in embryo 
All the misshapen progeny that lay 
    Athwart the path to thinking’s vrai niveau 
Of common speech. Such were those recherché 
     Linguistic idioms that he thought de trop 
Since parasitic on the DNA 
    Of communal accord, or the escrow 
That underwrote our forms of everyday 
    Folk-usage. This he showed us, modulo 
The need for umpteen exegetes to say 
    Just what it was his words were meant to show, 
As witness the shelf-bending dossier 
    Of monographs and endless de nouveau 
Renditions of old themes whose overstay 
    He’d hoped his Tractatus would long ago 
Have laid to rest. Last irony: that they, 
    His acolytes, should be the ones whom no 
Strict rule, like his, against such making hay 
    With words and concepts could persuade to throw 
The habit off despite its threat to fray 
    The bonds of communal accord and so 
Permit such verbal licence (aka 
    Delinquency) to twist the quid pro quo 
That constitutes a true communauté 
    De langue et vie. His tragedy: to know, 
If dimly, that he’d pointed them the way 
   And sounded the linguistic tallyho 
That led his followers to a disarray 
    Of language-games as likely to kayo 
That prospect as the mutants on display 
    In some linguistic isle where Doc Moreau 
Spliced metaphors like genes. And so, malgré 
    His dearest wish, this anti-Prospero 
Saw monstrous life-forms bred out of Roget 
    By language-games from his own portmanteau. 
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